Introduction
The process of globalization has forced or given incentives to workers (essentially white collars) to learn foreign languages and break linguistic barriers. In most cases, Europeans have chosen English as a second language, and (a poor version of) English has become the lingua franca in Europe. In 2006, 37 percent of the EU population speak it in a more than "basic" way; German and French come next with 22 and 17 percent. These numbers include native speakers. There are nevertheless many countries, including large ones such as Spain, France, Italy and Poland where less than 25 percent of the population speak the lingua franca. This situation is changing fast now, since among the youngest generations, the number of English speakers has become much larger.
1 Worldwide, English is spoken by more than 1.5 billion people (Crystal, 2001) , and is probably the language that is most often used in international contacts and trade.
But English is not the only language that has an economic impact on international trade. This is shown by Melitz (2008) , for instance, who uses two measures of linguistic distances 2 between trading partners and tries to estimate their separate effect on foreign trade. "Opencircuit communication" (OCC) demands that the language be either official or widely spoken (at least 20 percent of the population knows the language). Spanish, for instance, will be an OCC between Argentina (where 92 percent of the population knows Spanish) and Mexico (where this percentage is 88). Likewise, Arabic will be an OCC between Mauritania (38 percent) and Iraq (58 percent) 3 Melitz identifies fifteen such languages. A "direct communication" (DC) language is any language common (that is, spoken by at least four percent in each country) in a pair of countries. The rationale for introducing this second measure is based on Melitz's claim that any linguistic distance measure works in explaining the intensity of trades, but not all of them tell the same story. Noting that all OCCs are also DC languages but OCCs may have a larger impact on international trade, he suggests distinguishing channels through which the effect takes place, and separates therefore OCCs' additional effects that may depend on translation (which can be produced as long as there are enough people who can provide it in both countries) and DCs' effects which enable traders to communicate directly. His estimation results point to the following conclusions. "Direct communication" has obviously a large positive effect on trades: A ten percent increase in the probability that two citizens, one in country A, the other in B, speak the same language increases their trades by ten percent. European 4 OCCs also contribute, but with an additional effect. However, and interestingly enough, Melitz shows that English is not more effective 1 See Table 2 in Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and Weber (2009) . 2 The linguistic distance between two countries is equal to zero if they share the same language (Germany and Austria for example), and to one if they cannot communicate at all. Intermediate cases are possible; Italians and French can understand each other. For details, see Ginsburgh and Weber (2011, chapter 3) . 3 Numbers between brackets are those that appear in Table A1 of Melitz (2008) . 4 Other OCC languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Malay, Farsi and Turkish have no effect on trade.
than other European languages in promoting trade once the percentage of the population that knows it is controlled for.
Several papers analyse the effect that mastering the language of the destination country has for immigrants. 5 However, this strand of the literature usually focuses on the economic value of just one language, the one that is spoken in the destination country. Ginsburgh and PrietoRodriguez (2011) examine the importance of returns on several languages used at the working place by male native workers in nine countries of the European Union. In all nine countries, language proficiency has a positive effect on earnings, but results are heterogeneous. There are differences between Northern (Austria, Denmark, Finland and Germany) and Southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). In Northern Europe, English is used at the workplace by some 20 to 50 percent of the individuals, and benefits from larger (log) returns than other languages that are less spoken, but also less often used at the workplace. In Southern Europe, languages that are less known than English may also get larger rewards. And this is indeed the case for German in France, French in Greece However, most papers are focused on male workers Prieto, 2005 or Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir, 2002) or merely use a dummy to control for a possible gender effect (Bleakley and Chin, 2004 and Gonzalez, 2005) or estimate independent equations for female and male workers without exploring all the implications of gender (Dustmann and Van Soest, 2002) . There is a surprising lack of papers that examine the impact of foreign languages on wages of native workers by gender.
5 See, for instance, Bleakley and Chin (2004) , Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir (2002) , Chiswick and Miller (1995) , Dustmann and Van Soest (2002) and Leslie and Lindley (2001) . In this paper, however, we concentrate on native workers only. 6 Denmark in the North and Greece in the South are exceptions that are worth a couple of remarks. German is rather common in Denmark, where it is used in 10 percent of the cases, but its returns are much lower than those of English. This may be due to the fact that almost 40 percent of the Danish population knows German, while only 10 percent seem to be needed by firms, thus driving the return to German to almost zero. A similar, though weaker force is at work for English, which is known by 75 percent of the Danish population, and used by some 50 percent of the firms. This results in a positive return to English that is lower than in the three other Northern countries, where English is less frequently spoken. Greece is again a special case since Greek is not a Romance language. Therefore, Greeks may be indifferent between the cost of learning any Romance or Germanic language, but the expected benefit of English is higher. That is why the use of English by firms dominates.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of the most important foreign languages used at the workplace on wages of men and women, both at the mean and along the wage distribution, in six European countries: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. We find that the foreign language premium is present for both genders. However, the point estimate of the mean is always smaller for women, though the differences are hardly statistically significantly different from 0, with the exception of Germany (at 10%). The story is different along the wage distribution. In Denmark, Finland and Germany, there are no significant gender differences of the language premium along the wage distribution, and the premium varies somewhat, but stays close to the mean, both for men and women. This is not so in France, Italy and Spain, where premia differ across genders. A similar pattern can be found in Italy and Spain, where returns on foreign languages increase substantially for men (but not for women) in the upper deciles of the conditional wage distribution. Discrimination, or at least the existence of a glass ceiling linked to this specific type of human capital, is thus pointing its head under different forms in France, Italy and Spain, but much less so in Northern Europe.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model and the econometric issues in estimating its parameters using instrumental variables. Section 3 turns to the results obtained through usual IV and IV quantile regression methods, and discusses their economic relevance. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
The Model: Estimation and Data Used
Our purpose is to estimate the effect of language knowledge (and use at the workplace) on earnings. The standard (language-augmented) Mincer-type equation can be specified as:
for individuals i = 1, 2, ..., N, where the vector β and the scalar γ are parameters, w i represents the wage rate, x i is a vector of exogenous variables and u i is a random error. The vector x i contains the following control variables: two dummy variables that represent higher and secondary education (the omitted variable being primary or no education, respectively); the number of years of job tenure and its square; the number of years of potential experience (number of years spent working after schooling) and its square. Note that this specification does not include sector or occupation as a control. If knowing foreign languages is a prerequisite to securing a job in occupations such as international trade or international finance, then one would observe high wages in these occupations, but these would be due to language ability since workers with the same qualification but without knowing foreign languages would be working in other sectors or occupations. Therefore, controlling for occupation will underestimate the real value of language usage at the workplace.
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D i is usually a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if individual i reports being proficient in a specific language, and 0 otherwise, as in Galasi (2003) or Williams (2006) . Here we use a different specification, namely the share of the population that ignores the language used by the worker at his workplace. This so-called "disenfranchisement rate," varies between 1 if nobody (in a given country) knows the language and 0 if everyone knows it. 8 This is a measure of the scarcity of the language in a given country. Therefore, when an individual mentions a language used at her or his job, the disenfranchisement rate measures not only his knowledge (the supply side), but also what the firm needs, that is, the demand side and therefore we deal with the matching of workers to jobs. It may happen that a language with a high disenfranchisement rate is also one for which there are few opportunities to find a job where this language is requested, but if the worker finds a matching firm, his reward may nevertheless be important. This will have an influence on the estimation procedure since our definition of the language variable is not a pure human capital variable. Table 1 lists the values of disenfranchisement rates for the five main languages spoken by workers in the six countries of interest.
[ Table 1 approximately here]
The impact of languages on wages is represented by a unique scalar variable D i (or a polynomial of D i ). The reason is that we use instrumental variables to control for endogeneity.
Dealing with several endogenous variables may lead to inefficient estimation, especially when some of the dummy variables are, on average, close to zero (only a small percentage of Swedish workers speak Italian, for example). The scalar nature of D i will also be useful in our quantile instrumental variable estimation procedure. The expected value for parameter γ in (1) is positive, which implies that the larger the disenfranchisement rate, the higher the expected return on the language. This formulation has the advantage that all foreign languages are subsumed by a unique variable, while in every country, the effect of a language can easily be retrieved by multiplying γ by the disenfranchisement rate of the language.
The returns on language equation (1) is subject to unobserved heterogeneity similar to the one faced in estimating the returns on education. Indeed, both education and earnings may depend on unobservable individual skills and talent. Explanatory variables, in our case D i , will be correlated with the error term in equation (1), leading to biased ordinary least squares estimates. The solution is to use instruments. Van Soest (2001 and ) discuss a second issue, related to misclassified language indicators. In panel (or cross-section) data, language ability is usually self-reported by the worker, and is affected by two types of errors: a purely random error, that is independent over time and an error that is time-persistent, since an individual may have the same tendency to over-or under-report over time. 9 To deal with the time-independent measurement error, Dustmann and Van Soest suggest using leads and lags of self-reported language fluency as instruments for current fluency. They note, however, that this does not eliminate time-persistent errors. These are probably of limited importance in our case, since the language reported is the one used at the workplace, and the answer can hopefully be considered more objective. Hence, we expect estimates of languages returns to be unbiased when correcting for this kind of problem using lagged instruments. This leads us using D i,t-1 as instrument.
We also use Chernozhukov and Hansen's (2004 , 2005 instrumental variable quantile regression estimator, which allows studying how returns on languages vary at different points of the distribution of earnings. This has the additional advantage of reducing workers heterogeneity even if, as is the case in our GMM estimations, occupation is not controlled for. The reason is that unobserved characteristics will tend to be more similar around a specific wage quantile and, thus, occupational differences will tend to be small.
We expect higher wages to be linked to better occupations which often require managing in more than one language. People involved in the international strategy of a company should be able to use non-native languages in their job. Therefore, the use of foreign languages could be considered a necessary condition for promotion to some of the best positions. If this is true, estimating the effects at the mean of the wage distribution may not be sufficient to capture the whole picture and quantile regression could be more appropriate.
However, foreign languages knowledge is not a sufficient condition to reach top occupations. Not all workers who are competent in foreign languages will occupy top jobs. Beyond the relative scarcity of this skill, this may be due to gender differences in promotion policies. According to the glass ceiling hypothesis, the probability of being promoted, despite using more than one language in the workplace, would be much lower among women, all other observable characteristics being equal. In conclusion, if the wage increases associated with the use of foreign languages in the workplace are lower for women, especially at the very top of the wage distribution, this would be empirical evidence of a confirming the glass ceiling hypothesis.
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The database consists of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which contains information on panels of individuals in 15 European countries from 1994 to 2001 and which was also used in Ginsburgh and Prieto (2011) . This information is homogenous across countries since the surveys were coordinated by EUROSTAT, although the sample sizes vary across countries and years, and worse for our purpose, the questions on foreign language practices change over time. The surveys contain the socio-economic characteristics of individuals older than 16, grouped by households; they include personal characteristics, family structure, current employment, education and training, labour status, wages, family income from sources other than wages and salaries, region of residence, and languages (main and second) used at their main job. We include only natives, even if they do not have the citizenship of the country where they were born. Since most of them should have attended the national schooling system (or domestic international schools), we assume that they know the official language of the country. Table 2 contains information on the number of observations in each country, as well as on the share of individuals who report needing one or several among the main European languages, that is English, French, German, Italian, or Spanish, 12 in addition to the official language of the country.
[ Table 2 approximately here]
It is worth noting that the shares of workers of both genders, who use foreign languages at the workplace are more than twice larger in the two Nordic countries. However, there is no clear pattern with regard to the observed differences between genders. According to the t-test reported in Table 2 , the gap between the male and female shares of workers using a foreign language at work is not significantly different from zero in Finland and Italy although their levels are three times larger in Finland. In Denmark, France and Germany, a significant larger percentage of male workers use more than one language at job. Finally, only in Spain, do women use foreign language significantly more often than men, according to the estimated t-10 Quantile regression has being used several times to analyze wage differences across genders to test for the glass ceiling (and the stick floor) hypothesis. See, for instance, Albrecht et al. (2003) , Arulampalam et al. (2007) , Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) and Machado and Mata (2005) . 11 Since we also run IV quantile regressions, this allows us to compare directly the results of IV and quantile estimation. 12 If more than one foreign language is used, we assign the higher disenfranchisement rate to this variable.
test. Among those who use foreign languages, the average disenfranchisement rate in the sample is always very slightly larger for women, but the difference is statistically significant in France and Italy only.
Hence, there is some empirical evidence that female workers especially in romance language countries, specialize in foreign languages. Spain is the only analysed country with a share of workers using foreign languages at the workplace larger for female workers than for males; meanwhile France and Italy are the only two countries where the disenfranchisement rate is significantly higher for women than for men.
Results
We use two distinct econometric techniques to estimates the returns to foreign languages. We first estimate Equation (1) using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which is efficient in the case of heteroskedastic errors. This will give us the returns at the mean of the wage distribution. Then we turn to estimate the same returns at different points of the conditional distribution of log wages. Since workers in the same quantile of the conditional wage distribution can be expected to have similar unobserved characteristics (in particular, occupation), quantile regression may help to control for unobserved heterogeneity without over-controlling for occupation. Increasing returns along quantiles could be a signal of a positive correlation between languages and unobserved heterogeneity. Although standard quantile regression could limit this endogeneity problem, it is not clear that it will completely remove it. Research by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004 , 2005 , 2006 has extended the quantile regression approach to deal explicitly with endogeneity. They propose an instrumental variable quantile estimator which is naturally robust to weak identification and that we use here, with the same specification and instruments as in the GMM regressions.
Instrumental variable (IV) results, are described in Table 3 . In addition of the disenfranchisement rate, the regressions also include a small number of usual control variables, such as education (positive and significant influence), years of tenure (positive and significant influence, concave function in some cases), and potential experience (significantly concave curve in all cases, except for women in Finland). The variable of interest is linguistic disenfranchisement. In Denmark, Finland and Germany, the relation between log returns is quadratic (strictly concave and in each case (with the exception of women in Finland) both coefficients are highly significantly different from zero. In the three other (romance language) countries the relation is linear, and highly significant as well.
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[ Table 3 approximately here]
One important question is whether the returns inferred from these estimated coefficients are statistically different between genders. In Table 3 , we include a Wald test on the stability of the disenfranchisement estimated parameters between genders. For the quadratic specification, this test follows a χ 2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. According to the results of the tests, when returns of foreign languages are estimated at the mean, gender differences are only statistically significant for Germany (at the 7.5% level). Given the values of the disenfranchisement variable D i for German workers, this implies that German men get a higher return than women when they use English at the workplace but the difference is lower when they use other foreign languages.
14 Table 4 shows the returns obtained from our regression results, by multiplying the regression coefficients picked up by "disenfranchisement" and "disenfranchisement squared," by the disenfranchisement rates reported in Table 1 . These numbers should be taken with care, since in some countries, the number of workers who are observed speaking some languages (German in Finland for example) is quite small. As expected, the estimated returns on English are smaller in Denmark and Finland (where English is quite well known) than in France, Germany and Spain. However, they are also modest in Italy. In France, the returns on German and Spanish are larger than those on English, and so are those on French and German in Italy and Spain. Moreover, the number of workers who use these languages at the workplace, although smaller than those who use English, is not negligible. This is consistent with the findings by Melitz (2008) that English is not always the only communication language used in international transactions.
[ Table 4 approximately here]
The returns obtained by women are systematically smaller than those obtained by men with the exception of German in Finland (but the number of speakers of German is quite small to draw solid inferences). However, the differences are usually small and not statistically significant as discussed above. Thus, despite the significant differences in the shares of female and male workers using foreign languages at the workplace in Denmark, France, Spain and Germany, the estimations at the mean give little evidence of different returns between genders.
We now look at how the relation between returns and disenfranchisement varies at different points of the conditional distribution of (the log of) wages. Figures 1 to 3 summarize the results of the instrumental variable quantile (IVQ) regression run on dividing the wage distribution into 19 quantiles, both for men and women.
As mentioned earlier, since workers in the same quantile of the conditional wage distribution can be expected to have similar unobserved characteristics (in particular, occupation), quantile regression may help to control for unobserved heterogeneity without over-controlling for occupation. Increasing returns along quantiles could be a signal of a positive correlation between languages and unobserved heterogeneity.
[ Figures 1 to 3 approximately here]
In the figures, the continuous line represents the wage premium picked up by the disenfranchisement rate along the distribution of wages, and should be interpreted in the same way as the coefficient(s) at the mean of the IV regression. In this case, they measure the marginal effect of a change in the disenfranchisement rate on (log) wages in every specific quantile of the distribution. The shaded regions represent the 95 percent confidence intervals around the IVQ coefficients; they show that the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero with the exception of the Danish regression for women and in some lower and upper parts of the distributions. The horizontal discontinuous line represents the GMM linear 15 coefficients discussed in the previous section and the dotted straight lines delimit its 95 percent confidence interval.
For female workers, the effects of foreign language proficiency on earnings of both estimation methods (GMM and IVQ) lead to results that are often very similar and both methods find, in general, that using foreign languages generates significant wage premia, except for Danish women. Also, the females' wage premium is very stable over the entire distribution of wages, which implies that the returns are similar for all quantiles without rising at the upper end of the wage distribution, like in the case of men. In fact, in five of the six countries there is a smooth declining trend for the returns of women at the highest quantiles of the wage distribution.
For men, the returns on foreign language are strongly rising in the upper quantiles of the wage distribution in Italy and Spain. This is also true for Denmark; but the patter is less clear and only the differences between the two extremes of the distribution are significant. In these countries, the access of men to the most exclusive occupations seems to be linked with their knowledge of languages, maybe because these countries experience the highest English disenfranchisement rates and restrictions on language training are very important. For the rest of the countries the pattern is, as it is also for women, quite stable over the wage distribution.
If we compare genders, we can observe that the returns on foreign languages at work are higher for men than for women in certain areas of the wage distribution but the reverse does not happen and we never observe significant larger returns for women than for men in any quantile or country. On the one hand, in Northern countries (Denmark, Finland and Germany), one observes no significant gender differences, though in Denmark, these differences increase over the wage distribution. The returns of women always lie within the confidence interval of those of males. This is not so if we do the comparison the other way around. Then, the returns of Danish males' are not included in the females' confidence interval between the 55th and the 85th centiles. There is however no centile for which this difference in returns is significantly different from zero when considering the standard deviation of the difference of the estimated coefficients for both genders in Denmark.
On the other hand, one finds significant gender differences in Southern Europe. This is so in France in favour of male workers but these differences do not seem to be related to the glass ceiling hypothesis since the wage gap does not increase in the top of the wage distribution and is similar to the difference observed in other quantiles. However, in Italy and Spain, the large returns observed for males at the upper end (males can almost double their wages if they use a foreign language with a high disenfranchisement rate), the gender difference of returns sharply rises at the upper end of the wage distribution. This cannot be linked to an excess demand for women since the share of those who use foreign languages is larger than the share of men in both countries, but this difference is statistically significant in Spain only. Both observations lead to suspect that some discrimination against women is going on, or than men do not accept these higher positions without being paid more, while women do. Since this only happens at the very top of the income distribution, this may support the glass ceiling hypothesis in Italy and Spain. This is different in France since men are paid more along the whole distribution.
There are thus some differences between genders in France, Italy and Spain. Again, it is hard to infer whether this is correlated with the stylized facts mentioned in the introduction concerning the differences in the returns on languages between Northern Europe, where English is the lingua franca, and Southern Europe which also uses other languages than English. But it is remarkable that as we move south, gender differences in returns become more important.
Conclusions
Our paper shows that languages other than the national tongue used at the workplace lead to important returns on wages both for native male and female workers. As shown in many papers, this is also so for (usually male) immigrants who learn the national language of the country to which they move, but the returns they generate by knowing the national language are not as large. This finding is not unexpected since there is less market pressure to pay higher wages to immigrants who learn and speak the national language, than to nationals.
We use two techniques to evaluate these returns: Instrumental variables regression, which estimate the returns at the mean of the wage distribution, and instrumental variables quantile regression to estimate the returns at several quantiles of this conditional distribution. This made it possible to isolate two types of differences between men and women. In France, women with the same language abilities than men earn systematically (and statistically significantly) less than men, whatever in all quantiles. In Italy and Spain the same phenomenon is present, but only at the upper quantiles. In Germany and Finland, none of the two types of gender differences could be detected. In Denmark, despite the increase in the upper quantiles of males' returns, the gender differences in the returns associated to foreign languages are not significant. Additionally, we find that in romance language countries, women seem to specialize in languages more than men: Spain is the only analysed country with a share of workers using foreign languages at the workplace larger for female workers than for males; meanwhile France and Italy are the only two countries where the disenfranchisement rate is significantly higher for women than men. This indicates the possible existence of wage discrimination in these three Southern countries, since two workers using the same foreign language at their job will receive different wage premia depending on their gender. We also detected a glass ceiling for female workers in Spain and Italy. Returns for languages for which the number of users at the workplace is smaller than 1% of the country's sample are not displayed. Number of workers in brackets.
Figure 1 Quantile Regression Results: Denmark and Finland
The shaded regions represent the 95 percent confidence intervals around the IV quantile regression estimates of the effect of the disenfranchisement rate on wages (plain curves). The horizontal discontinuous lines represent GMM mean coefficients and the dotted straight lines delimit their 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 2 Quantile Regression Reults: Germany and France
Figure 3 Quantile Regression Results: Italy and Spain
